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OUTSOURCING GOVERNMENT REGULATION
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO†

INTRODUCTION
Regulation is not just for bureaucrats anymore. The government
has increasingly relied on private means to achieve public ends, not
only involving services to the public, but the origination and
implementation of regulatory policy as well, which is the primary
1
focus of this Essay. While this trend has the potential to improve
governmental performance, it also has the potential to cause
government failure, as several recent events remind us. In the
aftermath of the horrific events of September 11, 2001, it was revealed
that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had delegated
responsibility for airport security to the nation’s airlines, which in
turn had hired private firms that failed to provide an adequate level
of security.2 More recently, as a reaction to Enron and other recent
financial scandals, Congress prohibited the accounting industry from
writing the accounting and auditing standards used in governmentmandated financial disclosures, and it established a new
administrative agency to adopt such standards.3 Still more recently,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has found evidence
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1. For recognition and discussion of this trend, see generally Symposium, New Forms of
Governance: Ceding Power to Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002); Symposium,
Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1211 (2003). See also JOHN D.
DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 3 (1989)
(discussing the emerging practice of delegating public duties to private organizations).
2. See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
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of the failure of self-regulation at the American and New York
4
Stock Exchanges.
These public policy failures highlight the importance of
understanding when and where the involvement of private parties is
likely to serve the government’s objectives, and when it is not. This
Essay proposes that a transaction cost analysis is useful in comparing
5
the relative merits of government employees and private actors, and
that application of this framework suggests that a reasonable degree
of skepticism is appropriate about the practice of outsourcing
government regulation.
Transaction cost analysis is associated with the work of Professor
Oliver Williamson and his efforts to understand when economic
actors will engage in complicated contracting to purchase goods and
services, and when they will internally produce those goods and
6
7
services. This is often described as the “make-or-buy” decision.
Williamson has offered some preliminary thoughts on how the same
analytical tools can explain the institutional structure of public
agencies.8 This Essay proposes that the government’s decision to rely
on private means in a regulatory context is a type of make-or-buy
decision. When it makes this decision, an agency must determine
whether to produce and implement regulatory policy inside the
agency or involve private actors in these functions. It then uses
transaction cost analysis to develop a normative framework that
suggests when the government should outsource regulation.
My analysis proceeds as follows. The first two Parts of the Essay
explain the basic conceptual tools of transaction cost analysis, how
these tools account for the actions of private actors, and why these
4. See infra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.
5. An earlier and more limited attempt to establish this claim can be found at Sidney A.
Shapiro, Matching Public Ends and Private Means: Insights from the New Institutional
Economics, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 43 (2002). Professor Freeman briefly suggests the
possible utility of a transaction cost approach. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 573 n.108 (2000) (acknowledging the potential applicability
of transaction cost analysis).
6. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15–42
(1987) (explaining and analyzing the impact of transaction costs on the nature of economic
institutions).
7. See, e.g., Thomas B. Leary, The Dialogue Between Students of Business and Students of
Antitrust, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 13 (2003) (referring to the make-or-buy decisions made by
a rational company).
8. See Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost
Economics Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306, 308–26 (1999) (proposing how a transaction
cost perspective can illuminate the institutional form of public bureaus).
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tools are helpful in evaluating the rationality of outsourcing
government regulation. Part I explains how Williamson and others
link the institutional structure of economic organizations to
transaction costs. Part II contends that regulatory agencies confront
the same type of make-or-buy decision as private firms and proposes
a typology of private involvement in government regulation, which
reveals that the government can write and enforce its regulations, or
it can involve private actors in one or both of these functions.
Parts III through V evaluate when private involvement is more
or less likely to lower an agency’s transaction costs in each of the
three categories of private involvement identified in the typology
presented in Part II. Part III explains when an agency can reduce its
overall transaction costs by involving private actors in writing
regulatory standards. Part IV discusses when an agency can reduce its
overall transaction costs by hiring private actors to enforce
regulations and by negotiating with regulated entities concerning the
scope of enforcement. Finally, Part V considers when an agency can
reduce its overall transaction costs by relying on self-regulation by an
industry. The analysis in each of these sections focuses on the impact
of incomplete contracts, opportunistic behavior, and hold-up
problems in determining the agency’s transaction costs.
This Essay concludes by summarizing the results of the previous
analysis, which leads to three conclusions. First, there is no a priori
reason to conclude that outsourcing of government regulation will
decrease the government's overall transaction costs because
outsourcing is less costly in some cases and more costly in others.
Second, using government employees will often be the least costly
option because relying on private parties commonly involves
incomplete contracts, opportunistic behavior, and hold-up problems,
which significantly increase the government's transaction costs.
Finally, the decision to rely on private parties in circumstances where
the transaction costs are greater than using government employees is
a function of ideological or political motivations that are inconsistent
with the optimal implementation of the agency's regulatory mission.
I. ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
Transaction cost economics focuses on how economic actors
overcome collective action problems that prevent mutual gains in
trade. This Part describes the basic concepts of transaction cost
analysis—incomplete contracts, opportunistic behavior, and hold-up
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problems—and how such factors determine the nature of economic
institutions. It builds upon the seminal work of Oliver Williamson,
who has explained how the previously described factors determine
when a firm will move from reliance on contracting to internal
9
production of goods and services.
Professor Ronald Coase inaugurated transaction cost analysis by
observing that a business may be able to reduce its costs by bringing
transactions within the firm and avoiding the costs of negotiation
10
involved in using markets. Coase’s insight was that rational
economic actors make this make-or-buy decision on the basis of
11
which option has the lowest transaction costs. Transaction costs are
“anything that impedes the specification, monitoring, or enforcement
of an economic transaction.”12 Since Coase, economists have explored
how transaction costs determine the extent to which firms will engage
in simple market transactions, more complicated contractual
arrangements, or vertical integration.13 The goal is to identify the
properties of transactions that explain specific institutional
14
arrangements.
A firm’s make-or-buy decisions reflect a series of decisions about
15
contractual risks illustrated by Figure 1. A firm can purchase a good
or service in a market transaction without the benefit of negotiating
contractual protections for itself in an “unassisted market”
transaction, which is node A.16 If there is a risk of imperfect
performance by the other party, the index of contractual hazard (K)
17
becomes greater than zero. The firm can seek to buy the good or
service at a discounted price that reflects this risk, which is the
“unrelieved market” at node B.18 Because this choice does not involve
any contractual safeguards, the cost of such safeguards (S) is zero. If
this solution is not sufficient to safeguard the interests of the firm, it
9.
10.
11.
12.

WILLIAMSON, supra note 6, at 30–32.
R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 391–92 (1937).
Id. at 396–98.
AVINASH K. DIXIT, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC POLICY: A TRANSACTION-COST
POLITICS PERSPECTIVE 38 (1996).
13. See HENRY N. BUTLER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 685 (1998) (noting that a
“great deal” of law and economics research is built upon Coase’s original insight).
14. Brian Dollery, New Institutional Economics and the Analysis of the Public Sector, 18
POL’Y STUD. REV. 185, 192 (2001).
15. Figure 1 is drawn from Williamson, supra note 8, at 314.
16. Id. at 315.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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will seek to negotiate a contract with another firm that anticipates
potential problems and attempts to address them in the contract. I
will refer to this situation as “hybrid contracting” (node C) in order to
distinguish it from “classical” contracts where there is no cost
19
associated with contractual safeguards. A firm will resort to internal
organization (node D) only when this option has lower transaction
20
costs than hybrid contracting. The last two decisions—hybrid
contracting or reliance on internal organization—involve the makeor-buy decision that is analyzed by Williamson.
FIGURE 1
INSTITUTIONAL DECISION TREE
K=0

A (unassisted market)
S=0
B (unrelieved market)

K>0
C (hybrid contracting)
S>0
K: index of contractual hazard
S: contractual safeguards

D (internal
organization / firm)

Internal organization may be less expensive than hybrid
contracting because of transaction costs associated with three aspects
of contracting. First, the parties’ collective action may be impeded by
each actor’s self-interest. Self-interest may involve an open and
honest attempt by an economic actor to exploit its skills and assets, or
it may involve an effort to “mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or
otherwise confuse” when it is advantageous to do so, which
Williamson describes as “opportunism.”21 In either case, the
possibility of self-interested behavior increases “measurement” costs,
or the costs of monitoring and evaluating performance of the other
19. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 6, at 32 (noting that “classical contracts” suffice for
transactions with no significant contractual hazards).
20. Williamson, supra note 8, at 315.
21. WILLIAMSON, supra note 6, at 47, 49.
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22
party to a transaction. The concept of “principal-agent” is typically
used to analyze this problem of self-interest. The prototypical
principle-agent problem involves the difficulty that one actor (the
principal) will have in getting another actor (the agent) to work on
the first party’s behalf. A principal can reduce measurement costs to
the extent that it can use financial or other incentives to align the selfinterest of the agent with its own interests.23
Second, the parties operate under “bounded rationality”; that is,
the parties are subject to significant time, resource, and cognitive
24
restraints that limit their capacity to choose an optimal outcome.
Thus, although economic actors ideally would identify and negotiate
every possible contingency to a transaction, “[c]omprehensive
contracting is not a realistic organizational alternative when provision
for bounded rationality is made.”25 When contracts are incomplete,
the parties find themselves in a continual process of negotiation as
they attempt to adjust their actions and agreement in response to
changes in circumstances,26 which create what Williamson calls
“governance” costs.27
In light of the previous potential costs, economic actors will
choose institutional arrangements, which Williamson calls
28
“governance structures,” that minimize their transaction costs.
Assuming that internal organization involves the same production
costs as hybrid contracting, a firm will choose internal organization to
produce goods or services when this arrangement has lower
transaction costs than using hybrid contracting.
Third, the cost of contracting for the production of a good or
service is related to whether a transaction involves “asset specificity,”
or the development of resources that are specific or idiosyncratic to a
29
transaction. Because it will be costly for the actor that owns such an
asset to reconfigure it for other purposes, asset specificity gives an

22. Id. at 29.
23. See BUTLER, supra note 13, at 740–41 (describing the literature on agency costs as it
applies to shareholder control of modern corporations).
24. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 6, at 45–46 (defining “bounded rationality”).
25. Id. at 46 (citation omitted).
26. Id. at 21.
27. Id. at 29.
28. Id. at 21. As Williamson states, “[t]ransaction costs are economized by assigning
transactions (which differ in their attributes) to governance structures (the adaptive capacities
and associated costs of which differ) in a discriminating way.” Id. at 18.
29. Id. at 52–54.
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advantage to the other party to the bargain. For example, if a firm
builds a plant next to the buyer of its output, the buyer may reduce
the price it is willing to pay with the knowledge that it is costly for the
seller to find alternative customers. Because of this “hold-up”
problem, a firm may find that no one will contract with it and that it
30
will have to make the product or service itself.
To sum up, transaction cost economics is focused on explaining
the form in which economic transactions take place. A firm will adopt
the institutional arrangement (“governance structure”) that it
believes will minimize its transaction costs. Transaction costs are a
function of (1) incomplete contracts, which occur because of bounded
rationality; (2) opportunistic behavior, which occurs because of selfinterest; and (3) hold-up problems, which occur because of asset
specificity.
II. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
The form of economic institutions reflects the transaction costs of
collective action between economic actors. Similarly, the form of
political institutions is related to the transaction costs of collective
action between political actors. Despite this parallelism, the study of
31
“political” transaction costs is relatively new. This Part draws on the
incipient literature on political transaction costs and expands it to
include government regulation. Specifically, I explore three aspects of
political institutions. I first explain why political actors and economic
actors both confront similar problems of collective action, and why
the problems are of a greater magnitude in the governmental context.
I then briefly consider the collective action problems that voters and
members of Congress must overcome, which presents some concepts
that I draw on in the remainder of the Essay. I then focus on the
collective action problems that agencies confront in implementing
government regulation. In doing so, I propose a typology of private
involvement in government regulation, which reveals that agencies
confront a type of make-or-buy decision that is similar to the one that
involves private actors, and discuss why these make-or-buy decisions
are a function of the same properties—incomplete contracts,
opportunistic behavior, and hold-up problems—that affect private
30. Id. at 52–56.
31. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND
WHY THEY DO IT 358 (1989) (“The idea of transaction costs has not been applied, so far as I
know, to government activities.”).

SHAPIRO.DOC

396

06/21/04 4:03 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:389

transactions. Finally, I propose that transaction cost analysis offers a
useful normative framework to evaluate whether outsourcing
government regulation is appropriate.
A. Collective Action Problems
Like economic actors, political actors confront commitment and
enforcement problems, and, like economic institutions, political
institutions are designed to mitigate these problems. According to
Professor Douglass North, “political institutions constitute ex ante
agreements about cooperation among politicians. They reduce
32
uncertainty by creating a stable structure of exchange.”
The problems of collective action, however, are more daunting
for political actors than for economic actors. Measurement and
enforcement costs are far higher in political settings because “[i]t is
extraordinarily difficult to measure what is being exchanged in
33
political markets and in consequence to enforce agreements.” North
explains:
After all the basic separation between polity and economy has
always, even amongst the most confirmed libertarians, left a residual
of activities to be undertaken by government because of the
inherent difficulty that arose from the public good attributes, free
riding and costly information of certain types of activity. . . . Those
that can be readily handled by individual or small group bargaining
don’t need to be placed on the public agenda. . . . Thus the selection
process is one in which the high transaction cost issues gravitate to
34
the polity.

The magnitude of transaction costs in political settings has an
important ramification for normative evaluations of different
institutional arrangements. An existing structure should not be
condemned for its inefficiency unless a superior alternative exists in
light of the transaction cost problems. In the government context,
“[m]any apparently inefficient outcomes can in fact be understood as
consequences of constraints imposed by various transaction costs, or
as creditable attempts to cope with them.”35 Put another way, just

32. Douglass C. North, A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 355,
359 (1990).
33. Id. at 362.
34. Id. at 361–62.
35. DIXIT, supra note 12, at 146.
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because government institutions appear to be inefficient does not
necessarily mean that more efficient alternative arrangements exist.
Williamson goes further. He would apply a presumption of
36
efficiency to existing modes of government organization. He
acknowledges that “some may believe that an extant mode enjoys an
undeserved advantage by this presumption,” but the fact that “an
extant mode has survived a comparative institutional competition” is
37
a “rough and ready” test of efficiency. To rebut the presumption, the
analyst must show that a particular institutional arrangement arose
from some “unacceptable initial condition,” such as “conceptual
error” or “pathology.”38 Thus, the fact that most regulatory activities
are still done by government employees suggests that this institutional
arrangement is the most efficient form of establishing and enforcing
regulatory standards. As will be seen, transaction costs analysis
confirms this general conclusion.
B. Congress
In a representative democracy, there are several layers of
collective action problems, all of which create transaction costs. This
Section briefly considers those problems faced by voters and
members of Congress, and the next Section considers the collective
action problems that regulatory agencies confront.
Voters choose their elected representatives, which is a principalagency problem that creates high measurement costs for voters. In
turn, legislators must bargain with other legislators to provide
benefits to their constituents, a process that is hampered by bounded
rationality and the potential that legislators will renege on the
39
commitments they make to secure political deals. In designing laws,
Congress tries to ensure that the agencies that implement the
legislation fulfill legislative preferences, which is a principal-agent
problem that presents measurement and governance costs.

36. See Williamson, supra note 8, at 316 (arguing that existing modes of organization
should be presumed to be efficient unless a superior feasible alternative can be described and
implemented).
37. Id. at 316.
38. Id. at 317.
39. See Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress;
or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 138
(1988) (analyzing potential agency and transaction cost problems among members of
a legislature).
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As observers of government regulation well know, Congress
delegates broad policy discretion in some areas, but not others.
Professors David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran observe that this
decision is similar to the make-or-buy decision that economic actors
confront. They explain, “[w]hen making public policy the basic choice
is between production within Congress or delegation to the executive;
the details of policy either will be spelled out in legislation or will be
40
left for the executive branch to determine.” Epstein and O’Halloran
contend:
Just as transaction cost economics assumes that governance
structures will be chosen so as to minimize the transaction costs
associated with economic exchange, so political governance
structures should minimize the political transaction costs associated
with the implementation of a given policy where, again, these costs
41
should be assessed from legislators’ reelection perspective.

Delegation of substantial discretion to an agency, however,
creates the political equivalent of the “hold-up” problem identified
42
earlier. Because of bounded rationality and uncertainty, Congress
may not be able to specify the details of all future actions, yet it is
43
stuck with the discretion it has delegated to an agency. Using
Epstein’s and O’Halloran’s terminology, the legislative delegation
44
will be an incomplete contract. This suggests that Congress’s
willingness to delegate significant policymaking authority to an
agency will depend on the degree of oversight and monitoring
problems that may exist.45

40. DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION
COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 46 (1999).
Congress has the choice of a number of governance structures it can use to condition its
delegation of power to the executive branch, “including sunset provisions, reporting and rulemaking requirements, exemptions, and compensations for affected parties.” Id.
41. Id. at 46–47.
42. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
43. EPSTEIN AND O’HALLORAN, supra note 40, at 48 (observing that “potential executive
abuse of discretionary authority is the political equivalent of the hold-up problem”).
44. Id. at 48. Moreover, agencies lack legal authority to make a binding commitment not to
abuse discretionary authority because there are no legal means for current agency officials (or
the president) to bind the actions of future agency officials. Id.
45. Id. One conventional rationalization for vague delegations is that Congress lacks either
the technical expertise or the political will to write more specific legislation, Peter H. Aranson et
al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21–24 (1982), but there are
numerous examples of where it overcomes both of these factors. See Sidney A. Shapiro &
Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative
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C. Agencies
Just as Congress establishes a set of institutional arrangements
between it and agencies that reflect transaction costs, every agency
must determine the type of institutional arrangements on which it will
rely to implement its legislative mandate. In the congressional setting,
legislators are expected to choose institutional arrangements that
minimize the costs of achieving their objective, which in the economic
analysis of politics is usually assumed to be reelection.46 What about
agency officials? If members of Congress seek to maximize their
political efficiency in terms of reelection possibilities, what do agency
officials seek to maximize?
The conventional assumption in economic models is that public
officials have their own interests in money, security, status, and policy
47
that may or may not align with the interests of Congress. This is the
root of the principle-agent problem between Congress and agencies
discussed in Section B. The literature describes this problem as
“bureaucratic drift,” or the potential that an agency will adopt
outcomes different from the policies preferred by Congress when it
originally delegated power.48 Nevertheless, public officials do not
always act in this manner,49 and the extent of bureaucratic drift is
unknown.
For present purposes, I assume that agency officials will adopt
institutional arrangements that promote legislative goals at the lowest
transaction cost. I do this because I want to test when it is advisable to
involve private parties in the implementation of regulation according
50
to transaction cost analysis. Under this approach, reliance on private

Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 824–36 (discussing examples of legislation that limits
administrative discretion).
46. See, e.g., Weingast & Marshall, supra note 39, at 137 (basing transaction cost analysis
on legislators’ pursuit of the goal of reelection).
47. Terry M. Moe, Politics and the Theory of Organization, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 106, 125
(Special Issue).
48. See, e.g., Sean Gailmard, Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion, 18 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 536, 537 (2002) (discussing bureaucratic drift).
49. See, e.g., STEVEN KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY: A HOPEFUL VIEW OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 251–54, 266 (1987) (“[T[he more important a policy is, the less
important is the role of self-interest in determining that policy.”); Steven P. Croley, Theories of
Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 65–67 (1998).
Croley notes that “regulatory outcomes ameliorate market failures and vindicate the citizenry’s
interests . . . more commonly than other scholars of regulation acknowledge.” Id. at 66.
50. I am also assuming that the agency is implementing a legitimate public policy program.
I assume away the principal-agency problems between voters and legislators, because my focus
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parties in apparently inappropriate circumstances suggests
bureaucratic drift because agencies have not chosen the best
institutional approach for regulation.
I now turn to identifying how transaction cost analysis would
assist an administrator who seeks to determine in good faith when it is
advisable to involve private parties in the implementation of
regulation. I first identify a typology of government-private
relationships, then suggest how these choices constitute the same type
of make-or-buy decision that economic actors confront, and finally
discuss how transaction costs are a function of the same properties
that affect economic transactions.
1. Typology. Table 1 recognizes two policy-related functions:
the choice of regulatory standards and the enforcement of such
standards. It also recognizes that the government can be wholly
responsible for the development and enforcement of regulatory
standards, or it can involve private parties in these functions. Under
the traditional model (cell I), an agency writes a regulatory standard
and adopts it using notice and comment rulemaking. The agency then
enforces the regulation by adjudicating violations and determining
remedies. Alternatively, an agency can rely on private entities to
write regulatory standards that the agency ultimately adopts (cell II),
with or without changes, using notice and comment rulemaking. The
agency, however, relies on government employees to enforce that
regulatory standard. Or the agency can employ private parties to
enforce its regulations or negotiate with regulated entities over the
scope of compliance (cell III). In this category, government
employees are responsible for writing the standards that are being
enforced. Finally, an agency can rely on industry self-regulation (cell
IV), which involves private actors in both writing standards and in
enforcing those standards, subject to oversight by the agency. The last
three categories, in different ways and to varying degrees, involve
using private entities to originate and enforce government regulation,
51
as the following examples illustrate.
is on agency implementation of public policy. While this assumption helps focus the analysis on
the advisability of outsourcing government regulation, it also confounds my normative
evaluation. If an agency is charged with implementing a nonlegitimate public policy, there is less
harm to the public if the agency adopts a less-than-optimal implementation method than if it
optimizes its implementation. My conclusions should therefore be evaluated with this caveat in
mind.
51. Some of these examples are discussed in Freeman, supra note 5, at 636–64.

SHAPIRO.DOC

06/21/04 4:03 PM

2003] OUTSOURCING GOVERNMENT REGULATION

401

TABLE 1
MODELS OF REGULATION
Standard Setting

Governmental

Governmental

Private

I.
Traditional
Agency Model

II.
Contractual
Standard Setting

III.
Contractual
Enforcement

IV.
Self-Regulation

Enforcement

Private

First, private parties are greatly involved in the creation of
government regulation. There are numerous private organizations
that generate thousands of industrial codes and products standards,
and agencies incorporate these national consensus standards by
52
reference. For example, when the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) adopted 428 new protective health
standards in 1988, most of the new regulations were adoptions of
national consensus standards written by the American Conference of
Governmental and Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH).53 The National
54
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act requires federal
agencies to use voluntary consensus standards where appropriate and
when they will not conflict with applicable law, and to participate in
the development of such standards when such participation is
consistent with the agency’s mission.55 The Securities and Exchange

52. Id. at 639–40.
53. Air Contaminants, 54 Fed. Reg. 2332 (Jan. 19, 1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000
(2003)). In AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992), the court remanded the
regulations to OSHA because it had failed to provide a sufficient explanation for their adoption,
id. at 986–87, and the regulation was not readopted.
54. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, 110
Stat. 775 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 272(b)–(c) (2000).
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Commission (SEC) requires that financial statements be prepared in
accordance with accounting principles that have substantial
authoritative support, and until recently the agency relied on
contractual standard setting by private accounting associations to
56
produce such standards. In regulatory negotiation, an agency
depends on negotiations between private entities, who represent the
entities that will be regulated and the beneficiaries of the protective
standard, to write a regulatory standard.57
Second, just as private parties are involved in setting the
standards for government regulation, they are also involved in
determining the outcome of the enforcement proceeding in two ways.
On the one hand, an agency may actually hire private entities to
conduct inspections or adjudications. The FAA’s reliance on private
58
actors to maintain airport security, mentioned earlier, is an example
of this arrangement. So is the use of private insurance companies by
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to screen
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement claims from medical
providers.59 The California workplace safety and health agency, CalOSHA, delegated enforcement of safety standards at worksites to a
60
committee of union and employer representatives. On the other
hand, the government negotiates with private entities over the
enforcement of standards. It is common for agencies to settle an
enforcement action by reducing the penalty that is imposed in return
for the company’s agreement to comply with the regulation it has

56. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (And It Might Just Work), 36 CONN. L. REV. 915, 919 (2003) (“Stripped of power to
make authoritative auditing standards is the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(‘AICPA’), the industry body having since 1939 defined Generally Accepted Auditing
Standards (‘GAAS’).”). Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201), the SEC can still rely on contractual standard setting
but Congress established qualifications that private actors must meet and it subjected them to
new oversight. See infra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
57. See Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 32 (2000) (“Negotiated rulemaking is a process by which
representatives of the interests that would be substantially affected by a proposed rule negotiate
to reach a consensus.”).
58. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
59. Robert A. Berenson & Dean M. Harris, Using Managed Care Tools in Traditional
Medicare—Should We? Could We?, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 146 (Autumn 2002).
60. See JOSEPH V. REES, REFORMING THE WORKPLACE: A STUDY OF SELF-REGULATION
IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 1–2 (1988) (describing the Cal-OSHA program).
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61
violated. Enforcement negotiations, however, can result in outcomes
different than that achieved through adjudication or the settlement
process. OSHA, for example, may settle an enforcement case if the
employer will agree to undertake additional compliance efforts at
plants other than the one that the agency inspected, even though
OSHA has not found those other plants to be in violation.62 Similarly,
the EPA negotiates supplemental environmental agreements that
allow a regulated entity to avoid a traditional civil or criminal penalty
by agreeing to implement affirmative protection measures, such as
pollution prevention programs, not required by agency regulations.63
Finally, some self-regulation occurs in the absence of
government regulation. Such self-regulation often represents an effort
to head off the adoption of regulatory legislation. For example, the
Bush administration has chosen voluntary measures to control
greenhouse gases responsible for global climate change in lieu of
mandatory controls.64 Because I am discussing make-or-buy decisions,
however, this category involves self-regulation that occurs under the
auspices of an agency that oversees it. For example, although the
Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) has regulatory
authority to accredit hospitals for participation in Medicare and
Medicaid, it defers to the standard setting and enforcement activities
of the private Joint Commission on Health Care and Accreditation of
Health Organizations (JCAHO).65 Similarly, the SEC relies on selfregulation by the stock exchanges. The two major stock exchanges,
smaller regional exchanges, and the over-the-counter markets are all

61. See, e.g., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH LAW 316 (Stephen A. Bokat & Horace
A. Thompson III eds., 1988) (“[T]he Secretary [of Labor] has been extremely willing to
negotiate significant reductions in the amount of the proposed penalties provided there is
assurance of abatement.”).
62. See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Raytheon Aerospace, L.L.C., OSHRC Docket Nos. 01-1383
& 02-0613 Consolidated (March 24, 2003), at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_
document?p_table=CWSA&p_id=863&p_text_version=FALSE (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (implementing a corporate-wide settlement agreement).
63. Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,796
(May 5, 1998); see also ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN et al., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW
AND POLICY 1016–17 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing the EPA’s supplemental environmental project
policy).
64. Jennifer 8. Lee, Voluntary Pacts to Curb Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2002,
at A22.
65. Freeman, supra note 5, at 610–12.
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engaged in self-regulation under the regulatory supervision of the
66
Securities and Exchange Commission.
2. Transaction Cost Analysis. As the previous examples
indicated, a regulatory agency can rely solely on its own employees to
write and enforce regulatory standards, or it can involve private
parties in these functions. In deciding which form of collective action
to pursue, an agency makes a make-or-buy decision. Under the
traditional agency model, the government relies on internal
organization to make its own “goods” (regulatory standards) and
“services” (regulatory enforcement). Alternatively, the agency can
use one of the other three options, all of which involve hybrid
“contracting” for these same goods and services. The relationship
between an agency and private actors in these other options may not
involve an actual contract to “buy” a good or service, although it can.
Nevertheless, as Professor Jody Freeman indicates, the word
“contract” is a useful metaphor because it captures the give-and-take
relationship between the agency and private parties, and it usefully
distinguishes internal and external production of government goods
and services.67 I therefore describe agency use of privately developed
standards (cell II) as “contractual” standard setting, and agency
involvement of private actors in deciding levels of compliance as
“contractual” enforcement.
As Parts III and IV more fully develop, an agency’s reliance on
private parties creates several important transaction costs for the
agency. Whether the agency’s goals will be met is affected by a
private actor’s opportunistic behavior, fueled by its self-interest. If the
private entity is an economic actor (or if it is subject to the control of
economic actors), it will resolve policy issues in a manner that
maximizes its profit (or the profit of those who control it). Such
actions may be inconsistent with the agency’s goals established in its
66. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 10.2, at 458 (3d ed.
1996). Likewise, “[a]lthough the Commission has . . . the direct authority to regulate brokerdealers who are members of the [National Association of Securities Dealers], as a practical
matter the bulk of the day-to-day regulation is generally delegated to the self regulatory
organization.” Id. at 466–67.
67. Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1285, 1288 (2003). Whereas internal production is based on hierarchical relationships,
which is how agencies (like private firms) manage their own employees, the involvement of
private parties in regulation is a “set of negotiated relationships” that are “dynamic,
nonhierarchical, and decentralized, envisioning give and take among public and private actors.”
Freeman, supra note 5, at 571.
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statutory mandate. If the private actor is a nonprofit group, it may
resolve policy issues in a manner that it deems appropriate in terms of
its own objectives, but this resolution may also be inconsistent with
the agency’s goals established in its statutory mandate. The possibility
of opportunistic behavior therefore increases the measurement costs
of the government agency.
Moreover, any “contract” between an agency and private entities
may be incomplete because of bounded rationality, which creates
governance costs. When the transaction takes place under conditions
of uncertainty, the private actor may be able to exploit an information
advantage to take actions that are in its self-interest, but not in the
agency’s self-interest, which again raises the agency’s measurement
costs.
Finally, the agency may be subject to a hold-up problem similar
68
to the one identified by Epstein and O’Halloran. Once an agency
involves a private actor in making policy decisions, it may not be easy
for that agency to take back the responsibility for making such
decisions. For example, private actors may have the political power to
defend their participation in making regulatory decisions. This
security may encourage them to exploit their self-interest in ways that
are detrimental to the goals of the agency.
Thus, the agency’s cost of addressing potential opportunistic
behavior by a private actor is a function of the extent to which the
private actor’s interests originally are aligned with the agency’s
interests and the extent to which the agency can create incentives to
align its interests and the interests of the private actor. In the
commercial context, economic actors can establish contract terms,
such as bonuses tied to performance, which align their interests with
their agent’s interests. As Parts III through V explore, agencies may
or may not have the same option.
3. Make-or-buy? The advantage of transaction cost analysis in
this context is that it offers a framework for evaluating when
outsourcing government regulation is appropriate. Although relying
on private actors can save the government money, this choice can also
increase the government’s transaction costs when a transaction
involves significant opportunistic behavior, incomplete contracting,
and hold-up problems. An agency should rely on its own employees

68.

See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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when the transaction costs of relying on private parties makes
outsourcing more expensive.
More broadly, this framework suggests when reliance on private
actors is less likely to produce effective outcomes from the agency’s
point of view. When the agency confronts opportunistic behavior,
incomplete contracting, and hold-up problems, reliance on private
actors increases the risk that a transaction will not produce the
outcome desired by the agency. Thus, these properties indicate when
outsourcing may be inappropriate and when an agency should be
skeptical that outsourcing may be to the public’s advantage.
III. CONTRACTUAL STANDARD SETTING
Contractual standard setting is one of the three ways that
agencies can outsource regulation according to the typology identified
in Part II. In contractual standard setting, an agency relies on private
actors to write the regulatory standards that it ultimately adopts. The
agency reduces its transaction costs by relying on outside parties, but
it must compare this cost savings with the additional transaction costs
that contractual standard setting will entail. The agency’s transaction
costs are related to opportunism, incomplete contracts, and hold-up
problems. These costs often vary depending on whether the agency is
relying on private standard-setting organizations or whether it is
engaged in regulatory negotiation.
A. Private Standard-Setting Organizations
Reliance on private standard-setting organizations does not
appear to be justified for most types of regulatory standards. First, the
private actors are likely to engage in opportunistic behavior because
their goals do not correspond with the agency’s goals. Second, any
transaction between an agency and a private standard-setting
organization is likely to be incomplete because bounded rationality
makes it difficult for an agency to specify in advance the parameters
of the regulatory standard. Finally, reliance on private standardsetting organizations creates a hold-up problem. In light of these
potential problems, an agency’s reliance on private standard setting
suggests bureaucratic drift.
1. Opportunistic Behavior. An agency’s reliance on private
actors to write regulatory standards creates agency problems. The
incentives of the private actors who create the standards may be
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different than the incentives of agency officials who are attempting to
implement their statutory mandate in good faith. Private actors will
seek to resolve policy issues in a manner that maximizes their own
profit. If the private actor is nonprofit, its incentives may still be
inconsistent with the agency’s objectives, either because the group has
a different set of goals than the agency or because it is heavily
influenced by profit-maximizing private firms.
Private actors may have different goals than a regulatory agency.
For example, Congress has authorized agencies like the EPA to act
on the basis of the best available evidence to protect individuals and
69
the environment before harm occurs. By comparison, a private
organization may look to scientific norms to write protective
standards. These norms may require waiting until there is additional
scientific evidence before any conclusion is reached concerning the
risk posed by a chemical or other hazard.
Moreover, industry representatives tend to dominate
decisionmaking in many nonprofit organizations, and the standards
that are produced tend to reflect the self-interest of the corporations
70
for whom the participants work. The lack of non-industry
representatives leads private standard-setting organizations to strike a
different balance between cost and protection than that favored by
non-industry actors. As Professor Robert Hamilton has explained:
Because [of] the . . . industry orientation of most technical
committees, the costs and complexity of increased safety or purity
will almost certainly be weighted more heavily by these committees
than by an individual whose primary concern is safety or health. . . .
The welter of legislative enactments vesting issues of safety or health

69. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II) (2000) (“A determination to regulate a
contaminate [in drinking water] shall be based on . . . . the best available public health
information . . . . ”); see also 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000) (mandating regulation of toxic
materials in the workplaces based on the best available evidence).
70. See Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws
Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 124 (1993)
(finding that “certain interest groups seem consistently to get their way at the expense of
others” in the UCC drafting process, and that the history of Article IV demonstrates that, in
particular, banks “consistently win out at the expense of their customers”); Robert E. Scott, The
Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1809, 1850–51 (1994) (finding impressionistic and
empirical evidence that the private legislative bodies that drafted Article 9 of the UCC tended
to favor the interests of asset-based financiers over consumer interests). See generally Robert W.
Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal
Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1380–83 (1978) (concluding that
three groups—small business, labor, and consumers—are not adequately represented in private
organizations that write nongovernmental standards affecting safety and health).
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in the governmental agencies suggests that for most people the
balance provided by the private sector often fails to accommodate
71
health or safety considerations satisfactorily.

Private parties will be able more easily to exploit their selfinterest to the extent that there is asymmetrical information. An
agency may wish to employ a private entity to write a protective
standard because it has lower cost access to specialized information
than does the agency. The existence of asymmetrical information,
however, also invites opportunistic behavior by the private entity,
which can seek to exploit its superior access to the information to
serve its own self-interest. In such circumstances, the agency must
hire its own experts to review the work of the private entity. This last
step may make it as or more expensive to “hire” a private entity to
produce a standard than for the agency to produce the standard
internally.
One does not have to look very far to find evidence of selfinterest at work in the private generation of regulatory standards. For
example, OSHA’s adoption of protective health standards written by
72
the ACGIH was noted earlier. Professors McGarity and I have
found that these standards provide limited protection for workers in
many cases, because industry-dominated committees are more
reluctant than OSHA to characterize a substance as a carcinogen, and
less likely to rely on published scientific data instead of industrysupplied information.73 “When standards set by private organizations
are perceived as having regulatory implications, consensus becomes
harder to reach,”74 as regulated entities attempt to influence the
organization to take positions favorable to them.
In securities regulation, Congress recently addressed the role
played by self-interest in the generation of accounting standards.
Earlier it was noted that the SEC generally relied on the accounting
industry to produce the accounting standards that underlie SEC75
mandated financial disclosures. The SEC had relied on the private
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, a trade

71.
72.
73.

See Hamilton, supra note 70, at 1378.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
THOMAS O. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED
PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 283 (1993).
74. Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regulatory Compliance in Theory
and Practice: The Case of OSHA, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 97, 138 (2000).
75. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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association of financial auditors, and on the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB), both funded by the accounting industry,
76
77
for these functions. The new Sarbanes-Oxley Act breaks this link
between the industry and private standard setting, and it subjects
private standard setting to control by the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), as well as the SEC.78 The
addition of the PCAOB addresses the problem of asymmetrical
information, because it places an independent entity, with the
necessary expertise to review auditing and accounting standards, in
between the SEC and the adoption of industry-generated standards.
2. Incomplete Contracting. An agency’s transaction costs are
increased to the extent that private actors behave opportunistically in
writing regulatory standards. The agency’s transaction costs are also a
function of the incomplete nature of the transaction between it and
the private actors. Like private actors, public officials operate under
bounded rationality, which also means there is a type of “incomplete”
contract between the agency and the private actors to whom the
agency looks to write a regulatory standard. From the agency’s
perspective, the problem is in adequately specifying the goals or
parameters of the regulatory protections that the agency is seeking.
As students of regulation know, determining the appropriate level of

76. See Cunningham, supra note 56, at 919 (outlining Sarbanes-Oxley’s impact on these
organizations).
77. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003)).
78. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(c)(2). PCAOB shall “establish or adopt, or both, by rule, auditing,
quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards relating to the preparation of audit
reports for issuers.” Id. The PCAOB is a nonprofit private corporation, consisting of five
members, only two of who can be CPAs. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(e)(1)–(2). If one of the two CPA
members is chair, the person cannot have been a practicing CPA for at least five years prior to
the person’s appointment to the PCAOB. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(e)(2). The PCAOB is funded by
assessments paid by securities firms. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7219(d)(2). In adopting audit standards, the
PCAOB may rely on the recommendations of advisory groups or contractual standard setting
organizations, but it may rely on the latter only to the extent that they meet certain conditions.
These include that the group is not funded by the accounting industry and is controlled by a
board of trustees that consists of a majority of persons who have not been employed by public
accounting firms within two years of their appointment as a trustee. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77s(b)(1). All
standards adopted by the PCAOB are subject to review by the SEC, which has the authority to
amend or replace them. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7217(a)–(b). Further, Congress permitted the SEC to rely
on privately generated, general accounting principles by the FASB or some other group, but
only if it meets the same conditions concerning financial support and the board of trustees that
apply to contractual standard setting entities on which the PCAOB might rely.
15 U.S.C.A. § 77s(b)(1).
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regulation and how best to achieve it can require making decisions on
the basis of incomplete information and the resolution of difficult
79
value conflicts. Moreover, the reconciliation of value conflicts is not
limited to health, safety, and environment regulation because society
has regulatory goals other than economic efficiency even in
commercial contexts.80
In these circumstances, the privately developed standard is
unlikely to capture the resolution of information defects and value
81
conflicts that the agency intended, which will require the agency to
rewrite the standard or even to withdraw it, resulting in higher
transaction costs for the agency than if it had written a proposed rule
itself. The agency is more likely to avoid these costs if it is proposing
to adopt technical standards that do not involve the type of
information defects and value conflicts that make more policyoriented rules controversial.
Agencies can work with contractual standard-setting
organizations in the development of regulatory standards, a strategy
that increases the agency’s governance costs, but not as much as if the
agency is forced to rewrite a privately proposed standard in a
substantial manner in the rulemaking process. Indeed, Congress has
ordered agencies to engage in such participation under appropriate
82
circumstances.
3. Hold-Up Problems. Besides incomplete contracts and
opportunism, agency use of privately written regulatory standards
presents one additional problem: it creates an equivalent of
Congress’s hold-up problem identified above. As noted earlier in
Section II.B, Congress may be reluctant to delegate policy discretion
to agencies because Congress may lack effective means to control the
outcome of the decisions that are reached once the delegation

79. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 20–24 (2003) (discussing bounded rationality and the
need to reconcile conflicting values in the context of protecting individuals and the
environment).
80. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 322 (2002)
(proposing that commercial regulation can involve noneconomic goals such as “fairness”).
81. See id. at 348–49 (arguing that current safeguards fail to protect noneconomic goals in
contractual standard-setting situations).
82. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
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83

occurs. When an agency establishes a pattern and practice of relying
on privately generated standards, as the SEC did with the accounting
industry, the agency may likewise find it difficult to modify or reject
those standards when it is advisable to do so.
An agency may find itself in this situation for two reasons. First,
the reliance on privately generated standards frees an agency from
developing the extensive expertise that is necessary to write standards
itself. At the same time, this may mean that the agency lacks the
expertise to oversee the standards-writing process in an effective
manner. Second, to the extent that a politically powerful industry
supports private standard setting, the agency may find it politically
difficult to engage in extensive rewriting of private standards,
although it has the legal capacity to do so. The more financially
valuable it is for an industry, like the accounting industry, to defend
the standards that they write, the more money they will invest in
political donations, lobbying, and legal strategies to protect their
interests.
In these situations, it may be more difficult for the agency to
assert its authority to change or to modify privately generated
standards than to have relied on internal production of regulatory
standards in the first place. Thus, when an agency is likely to find
itself in this situation, internal standard setting is advisable and the
agency should develop the expertise to write its own standards.
B. Regulatory Negotiation
As compared to private standard setting, regulatory negotiation
is less vulnerable to opportunistic behavior. Nevertheless, regulatory
negotiation may not be advisable because of incomplete contracting,
and an agency may also have a type of hold-up problem if it employs
it. Still, on balance, this approach presents fewer transaction cost
problems than private generated standards.
1. Opportunistic Behavior. An agency’s reliance on private
actors to write regulatory standards invites opportunistic behavior on
their part. In this regard, regulatory negotiation is a distinct
improvement. Whereas decisionmaking in private standard-setting
organizations tends to reflect negotiations among corporate interests,
a regulatory negotiation involves the participation of representatives

83.

See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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84
from all affected interests. While each participant may have its own
self-interest, the result of the regulatory negotiation will not be as
one-sided as private standard setting, because regulation negotiation
employs a consensus decisionmaking rule.85

2. Incomplete Contracting. Agencies nevertheless may find it
difficult to rely on regulatory negotiation to establish certain types of
regulatory standards because of the difficulty of specifying in advance
a set of policy parameters that will lead to the resolution of
information deficiencies and value conflicts in a manner acceptable to
the agency. Thus, an agency should not use regulatory negotiation in
situations where the negotiation may produce a result that is outside
of the policy parameters that the agency considers reasonable. If the
agency cannot specify these parameters with reasonable specificity,
the agency may have to reject the results of the regulatory
negotiation. The Administrative Conference acknowledged this
difficulty when it warned that only certain types of regulatory issues
are suitable for regulatory negotiation.86
3. Hold-Up Problems. Regulatory negotiation also presents a
type of hold-up problem. Once an agency charters a regulatory
negotiation, it is not completely free to disregard the results for two
reasons. First, the members of the group may be able to bring
political pressure on the agency to adopt the rule. Second, if the
agency does refuse to adopt the rule, or significant parts of it, it is
likely to discourage the participation of private parties in future
regulatory negotiations, because they will be concerned that they are
wasting their time. In other words, the private parties will seek to
protect their specialized assets (the results of the regulatory
negotiation) through political pressure, or they will be reluctant to
devote time to a regulatory negotiation because it creates a
specialized asset that cannot be used for other purposes.
The degree to which this is a problem is hard to determine. In a
well-known case study of a regulatory negotiation at the EPA that
84. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
85. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 92–97
(1982) (discussing consensus in regulatory negotiation).
86. See ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1995) (not included in C.F.R.
after 1995), reprinted in ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, NEGOTIATED
RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK 12 (1995) (identifying the conditions under which regulatory
negotiation is more likely to be successful).
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resulted in a regulatory standard for wood stoves, Professor Bill Funk
found the negotiation led to a result that was not authorized by
87
statute, but the EPA adopted the standard nevertheless. Proponents
of the process find this concern to be overstated, because a court can
also strike down a regulation if it is not authorized by the agency’s
mandate.88 Of course, as Funk notes, if the regulatory negotiation
truly succeeds, no one will challenge the rule because all of the
interested actors were represented in the negotiation and approved of
the result.89 Moreover, the problem only exists to the extent that
regulatory negotiation produces an unacceptable rule that the agency
nevertheless cannot reject. Agencies can avoid this result by
participating in the regulatory negotiation and by choosing
negotiators who steer the participants into an agreement that falls
within the policy parameters that the agency is willing to accept.
Bounded rationality and the hold-up problem may help to
explain why agencies have made relatively limited use of regulatory
negotiation, although it is unclear what proportion of regulatory
issues may or may not be suitable for regulatory negotiation because
90
of these problems. Nevertheless, internal production of regulatory
standards can be the preferred option. Therefore, rational action
requires a comparison of the transaction costs of each option.

87. William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiations and the Public
Interest—EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 66–78 (1987) (concluding that the draft
rule proposed by regulatory negotiation and adopted by the EPA as proposed was of dubious
legality).
88. See, e.g., Phillip J. Harter, The Role of Courts in Regulatory Negotiation—A Response
to Judge Wald, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 51, 62 (1986) (“Were it not for judicial oversight, it
would surely not be inconceivable for the negotiating parties to make impermissible ‘deals’ that
are outside Congress’s contemplation.”).
89. See Funk, supra note 87, at 94 (“Discretion delegated to the agency by Congress is
effectively exercised by the group of interested parties, constrained only by the need to obtain
consensus.”).
90. Some observers suggest that agencies fail to use regulatory negotiation because it is not
more efficient than traditional rulemaking, but other analysts deny this claim. Compare Cary
Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Phillip Harter, 9
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386, 447 (2001) (asserting that regulation negotiation “demands a
concentrated investment of time and resources by all involved, but without any clear
corresponding return in terms of avoiding litigation or achieving other goals”), with Jody
Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 60, 62 (2001) (concluding that studies “tend, on balance, to undermine arguments
made by the critics of regulatory negotiation and to bolster the claims of proponents”). If
regulatory negotiation is more efficient, the reasons suggested in the text are more plausible
explanations of why agencies do not use this process more.
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IV. CONTRACTUAL ENFORCEMENT
According to the typology set forth in Part II, contractual
standard setting is one of the three ways that agencies can outsource
regulation. Agencies can also involve private parties in the
enforcement of regulatory standards after they are adopted. There
are two types of contractual enforcement relationships between an
agency and private actors. First, the agency can hire private actors to
enforce its regulatory standards in lieu of relying on government
employees. Second, the agency can negotiate with private parties
concerning the scope of compliance. While these negotiations can
produce the same outcome as traditional enforcement, at times, they
can lead to very different outcomes. In either situation, the outcome
is the result of an agreement between the agency and a regulated
entity that determines the scope of regulatory protection.
A rational administrator will involve private parties if it reduces
the agency’s transaction costs as compared to the costs of using the
traditional model. This Part considers the two methods of involving
private actors and the implications of a transaction cost analysis of
each. The transaction cost analysis suggests that relying on
government employees to enforce agency regulations involves lower
costs for an agency, even if private actors have a profit motive to be
more efficient than government employees. Additionally, the analysis
reveals that it is less expensive for an agency to settle an enforcement
action than to litigate it, but this is less true when the negotiated
settlement requires a different level or type of compliance than
regulations normally require.
A. Hiring Private Actors
When an agency hires private actors to conduct inspections or
adjudications, it is substituting private actors for public employees in
providing a government service. There is considerable literature on
91
using private entities to provide government services, although its
focus is generally on nonregulatory functions, such as contracting for
92
garbage pickup. In these contexts, the government saves money if
private firms can provide the same level of service (or better) than
government employees, and for less money. In theory, private

91. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 1, at 57–58 (discussing the evidence that private firms
are more efficient in the provision of services, such as garbage collection).
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managers have greater authority and incentive to act efficiently than
93
governmental managers. Private actors are not constrained by civil
service regulations when they hire and fire employees, and they are
not bound by other legal and constitutional constraints that raise the
cost of providing government services, such as due process. Private
actors have a greater incentive to act efficiently because they have a
profit motive. Consistent with these factors, academic studies find
private companies generally provide governmental services more
cheaply than do their governmental counterparts.94
It does not follow, however, that agencies will reduce their
transaction costs by hiring private actors to engage in enforcement
functions. In fact, it may be more expensive for an agency to use
private actors than to use government employees because of
opportunistic behavior and incomplete contracting.
1. Opportunistic Behavior. In making outsourcing decisions, an
administrator, like an economic actor, must consider how a private
firm’s self-interest may influence its performance, and whether the
firm’s incentives are sufficiently aligned with the goals of the
government agency to ensure competent performance. The problem
here, of course, is that profit-seeking private entities may attempt to
reduce the quality of their services to make more money, which
increases the government’s “measurement” costs. Unfortunately,
there is no better example of the adverse impact of a private actor’s
opportunistic behavior than the failure of the airlines to provide
adequate security for airports prior to September 11. The FAA had
delegated this function to the airlines, which had hired private firms
95
that failed to provide an adequate level of security, a problem that
96
the FAA had detected but failed to correct before September 11.

93. See WILSON, supra note 31, at 349 (indicating why agencies are less likely than private
firms to operate efficiently in providing services).
94. Id. at 350 (finding that, “with few exceptions,” the evidence indicates that private firms
are more efficient than government in providing services).
95. See U.S. General Accounting Office, AVIATION SECURITY: WEAKNESSES IN AIRPORT
SECURITY AND OPTIONS FOR ASSIGNING SCREENING RESPONSIBILITIES, GAO-01-1165T, at 1
(Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d011165t.pdf (Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives) (“[T]esting of screeners shows . . . long-standing weaknesses—measured by
the screeners’ abilities to detect threat objects located on passengers or contained in their carryon luggage—continue to exist.”).
96. The FAA had proposed a regulation that would have required higher levels of security
by the airlines and the security firms they hired, but development of the regulation was bogged
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Congress reacted to this potential for opportunism by making airport
97
security a function of governmental employees.
I have been assuming that that agencies will act in a rational
manner to employ private actors, only doing so when it is less costly
than relying on government employees. If, however, an agency fails to
measure effectively the private firm’s performance, it has no
assurance that private entities are performing in a manner consistent
with the government’s objectives. A recent exposé, for example,
revealed that mistakes by a private firm hired by the FAA to approve
modifications to airplanes apparently led to the crash of a Swissair jet
98
that killed over 250 persons. Moreover, lax FAA monitoring of
private inspectors is suspected to have played a role in other aircraft
accidents.99 Although the FAA has taken additional steps to improve
its oversight, GAO still found that the agency has failed to establish
100
Moreover,
“strong oversight and accountability procedures.”
according to its critics, the FAA lacks the technical expertise and
101
resources to oversee the projects.
The decision to employ private firms may also reflect political
102
influences rather than transaction cost analysis. For example, the
primary motivation of delegating healthcare enforcement
responsibilities under Medicare to private interests, including the role
of JCAHO mentioned in Part II.C.1, appears to have been a desire to
deflect the political opposition of the medical care interests to
government regulation, rather than to reduce transaction costs.103 The

down, and it was not in effect at the time of the attacks. See Delay, Dilute and Discard: How the
Airline Industry and the FAA Have Stymied Aviation Security Recommendations, PUB. CITIZEN,
Oct. 2001, at 2, 3 (describing the failure to implement the 1996 recommendations of the White
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security).
97. Aviation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101(e), 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
98. Gary Stoller, Doomed Plane’s Gaming System Exposes Holes in FAA Oversight, USA
TODAY, Feb. 17, 2003, at 1B.
99. See Editorial, FAA Failings in Swissair Crash Follow a Too-Familiar Pattern, USA
TODAY, Feb. 26, 2003, at 12A (discussing the FAA’s role in a 1996 Valuejet crash, a 1998
Swissair crash, and a 2000 Alaska Airlines Crash).
100. U.S. General Accounting Office, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION:
REAUTHORIZATION PROVIDES OPPORTUNITIES TO ADDRESS KEY AGENCY CHALLENGES,
GAO-03-653T, at 24 (Apr. 10, 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03653t.pdf.
101. See Stoller, supra note 98.
102. Professor Schwarcz makes this point but assumes for his analysis that private actors are
disinterested and have no conflicts of interest. Schwarcz, supra note 80, at 319 n.2, 321 n.10.
103. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Medicare and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations: A Healthy Relationship?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 23–25
(Autumn 1994).
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use of private actors to accredit education institutions may similarly
104
reflect political motivations.
2. Incomplete Contracting. The cost of outsourcing government
enforcement activities is in part a function of the degree to which the
private actors hired by an agency will engage in opportunistic
behavior. However, the cost of outsourcing is also a function of the
extent to which such contracting is incomplete—that is, the degree to
which the performance of the vendor can be specified in advance. To
the extent that contracts are incomplete because of bounded
rationality, the agency must pay higher governance costs, because
incomplete contracts require subsequent negotiation and
105
adjustment. The literature on outsourcing government services
recognizes this distinction when it notes that it is easier to contract for
government services in cases where the parameters of a vendor’s
performance can be clearly specified in advance.106 This means it is
easier for the government to contract for garbage pickup than for
private prisons because the former function does not require
discretionary judgments by private employees in circumstances in
which it is difficult to specify in advance how the employees should
act. The hiring of private entities to conduct inspections or administer
adjudications presents the same issue. The government’s monitoring
costs will go up to the extent that it is unable to write complete
contracts indicating how private employees are to resolve issues that
require difficult judgments and the balancing of multiple factors. If an
agency fails to engage in such monitoring, it has no assurance that
private entities are performing in a manner consistent with the
government’s objectives.
Williamson demonstrates the difficulty of contracting for
government services involving bounded rationality when he considers
whether the government should contract with a private agency to
107
conduct foreign affairs instead of the State Department. As
Professor James Q. Wilson indicates, the problem is that “[i]t would
104. Clark C. Havighurst, Forward: The Place of Private Accrediting Among the Instruments
of Government, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 7 (Autumn 1994) (suggesting that educational
accreditation is common because the first amendment tradition discourages government from
engaging in direct regulation of education).
105. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 67, at 1342–43 (noting that government performance may
be preferable when contracts are incomplete because the task is difficult to specify).
107. Williamson, supra note 8, at 326–27.
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be difficult if not impossible to write a contract that specified in
advance what the firm . . . should do in each case, in large part
108
Williamson
because the government itself does not know.”
concludes: “Such massive incompleteness greatly complicates and
even vitiates any effort to privatize foreign affairs.”109 To ensure that
the government’s interests are properly implemented, the
government would have to be in continuous negotiation with the
private contractor, which makes it less expensive to have these
activities done within the government in the first place.
The use of private actors for enforcement purposes is neither as
simple as contracting for garbage pickup nor as complicated as hiring
a private firm to conduct foreign policy on behalf of the United
States. Nevertheless, many such programs would appear to be closer
to the State Department than the Sanitation Department because the
resolution of many enforcement issues inevitably involves a
discretionary judgment, the parameters of which are difficult to
110
specify in advance.
3. Make-or-buy? The cost of adjustments (attributable to
bounded rationality) and oversight (necessary because of potential
opportunistic behavior) at some point makes reliance on private
contractors for enforcement purposes more costly than using
government for the same functions. This situation may arise more
often than supporters of outsourcing believe, especially in situations
where highly incomplete contracting is likely. While there is a cost to
overseeing government employees, such employees have less
incentive to act opportunistically and to exploit the agency’s bounded
rationality than do private, profit-seeking actors. Furthermore, the
comparative cost of internal production may not be significantly more
expensive once the government takes into account that outsourcing
still requires an agency to have sufficient expertise to oversee the
private contractor. Consider, for example, the FAA’s apparent failure
111
to monitor adequately private aircraft inspectors. If, as the GAO
suggests,112 the FAA must spend more money on its oversight,
108. WILSON, supra note 31, at 358.
109. Williamson, supra note 8, at 331.
110. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (observing that prosecutorial
decisions involve a “complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within
[the] expertise” of an agency).
111. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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including hiring more experts, it may be more cost-effective to hire
government employees to perform the same services because they
would not have the same incentive to cut corners as profit-seeking
actors.
Because of the high cost of government enforcement, which
requires adjudication and judicial review, it may still be less expensive
to employ private actors, even taking into account the cost of
effective oversight and monitoring. Employing private actors
becomes more cost-effective if agencies can find ways to improve
government oversight—i.e., to reduce measurement and governance
costs. The literature contains a number of such recommendations,
such as requiring government contractors to issue detailed reports
113
about their activities. These are good ideas, but it is not clear how
effective they are or whether they make outsourcing less expensive. If
the government requires reporting, for example, it will raise the cost
of hiring private actors to engage in enforcement activities. Moreover,
even if private actors are required to make reports, an agency must
still determine whether the information being reported is accurate.
4. Public Norms-Private Execution. There is a final factor that
will affect whether hiring private enforcers reduces the government’s
transaction costs. One of the criticisms of outsourcing government
services is that private actors are not constrained in the same manner
as government actors to obey such important norms as fairness,
nonarbitrariness, and nondiscrimination.114 Indeed, private actors may
be more efficient than the government actors to some extent precisely
because they do not share these obligations. As Professor Freeman
notes, the government can require private actors to meet these social
goals,115 but doing so raises the transaction costs of both the private
actor and the government. Private actors will have higher costs
because they will have to obey the same public norms as public
actors. The government will have higher transaction costs because it
will need to monitor compliance with these norms in addition to
monitoring compliance with the other contract terms. Earlier, it was
113. See Schwarcz, supra note 80, at 337–38.
114. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1246 (2003) (warning that privatization “creates possibilities
of weakening or avoiding public norms that attach, in the legal sense, to ‘state action’ or conduct
by government”).
115. See Freeman, supra note 67, at 1285 (“Surely the state can exact concessions—in the
form of adherence to public norms—in exchange for contracting out its work.”).
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noted that hiring private enforcers may not reduce the government’s
116
transaction costs in many instances. If private enforcers are required
to comply with public norms, this would appear to be even more true.
B. Enforcement Settlements
Agencies can hire private actors to perform enforcement services
for them. The other type of enforcement contracting involves
negotiations between an agency and regulated entities concerning the
scope of enforcement. The settlement of enforcement cases is
standard practice at all agencies. An agency, however, can act as an
enforcement entrepreneur. This occurs when an agency negotiates an
enforcement agreement that results in an outcome different than one
that could be achieved through adjudication of the citation. OSHA
will reduce a company’s fines, for example, in return for which the
corporation agrees to implement a safety plan at all of its plants and
not just the one that was found by the agency not to be in
compliance.117 Similarly, the EPA will agree to reduce environmental
fines in return for which a corporation adopts new, preventative
efforts not required by law.118
In both routine and entrepreneurial negotiations, the outcome is
based on a contract between the agency and the regulated entity,
rather than a legal order. From a transaction cost perspective, both of
these approaches can reduce the cost to the government of obtaining
regulatory compliance, and entrepreneurial agreements may make it
possible for the government to obtain a better outcome at a lower
cost than alternative ways of obtaining the same objective.
Nevertheless, transaction cost analysis explains why traditional
enforcement may be preferable to both approaches to enforcement.
1. Routine Agreements. In routine enforcement agreements, the
agency agrees to reduce the amount of the fine imposed and the
regulated entity agrees to comply with the regulation or regulations
the agency is seeking to enforce. The agency therefore avoids the
costs of litigating the issue of compliance and defending any
subsequent lawsuit challenging the outcome that a regulated entity
might file. Thus, such routine agreements have the potential to reduce
significantly the agency’s transaction costs.
116.
117.
118.

See supra Parts IV.A.1–2.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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This type of negotiated settlement is therefore generally
preferable to traditional enforcement, but this conclusion assumes
that the agency has acted in good faith in negotiating the enforcement
settlement and that the agency ensures that the regulated entity
actually complies with it. Experience indicates that agencies cannot
always be trusted to act in this manner. Settlements can be used to
water down regulatory protections and provide opportunities for de
119
facto deregulation, and agencies can fail to ensure that companies
120
live up to their negotiated settlements.
This type of bureaucratic drift presents a considerable agency
problem for regulated beneficiaries and political institutions
responsible for ensuring that agencies effectively enforce their
regulations. Even if regulators act in good faith, however, the use of
negotiated settlements in routine cases may not always be preferable
to traditional enforcement.
a. Opportunistic Behavior. Although negotiated settlements
generally reduce an agency’s transaction costs, a strategy of reducing
penalties to settle disputes and avoid litigation may be more costly in
the long run if it leads to less regulatory compliance. When a firm
determines whether to comply with a regulation, it considers the
probability that a violation will be detected and the size of the penalty
121
that will be enforced. Thus, the optimal strategy for a regulated
entity may be to risk detection when an agency routinely settles
enforcement cases for small fines. If a substantial number of firms
behave in this manner, the settlement of regulatory violations for
reduced fines can increase an agency’s enforcement costs.
The enforcement literature suggests that agencies should adopt
an enforcement strategy that distinguishes between regulated entities
that are habitual offenders and entities that are likely to obey agency
regulations, even if the second group has committed relatively minor

119. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of
Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1222 (1998) (noting the risk that
regulatory enforcement may be captured by those an agency is ostensibly regulating); see, e.g.,
JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 40–59
(1995) (describing the lack of effective EPA enforcement in the Reagan administration).
120. See, e.g., David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, Deaths on the Job, Slaps on the Wrist, N.Y.
TIMES, January 10, 2003, at A1 (explaining the failure of the EPA and OSHA to stop hundreds
of violations at plants run by McWane, Inc. after prior negotiated settlements).
121. Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 74, at 106.
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122
or technical violations. Reformers recommend that agencies impose
token fines or provide training and information about compliance in
return for an agreement by regulated entities that fall into the second
group to come into compliance.123 The literature argues that many
companies will comply with what they perceive to be reasonable
government regulation and that a punitive approach is unnecessary
and even counterproductive to gaining compliance.124 By comparison,
the literature recommends escalating penalties for habitual offenders
who are likely to take advantage of a cooperative enforcement policy
in which agencies are continuously willing to settle cases for the
payment of reduced fines.125

122. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 24 (1992) (asserting that an enforcement
strategy “based mostly on punishment will undermine the good will of actors when they are
motivated by a sense of responsibility”); EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY
THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 105–06 (1982) (noting that
when firms with good compliance records inadvertently violate regulations because rules are
complex or ambiguous, managers are likely to regard punishment as unwarranted and unfair);
John T. Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement, 6 L. & POL. 385, 385 (1984)
(noting a cooperative policy requires “agencies to be reasonable toward cooperative firms,
vengeful toward cheaters, unrelenting in pursuit of chronic evaders, but conciliatory toward
repentant firms”).
123. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 122, at 35 (recommending a pyramid
strategy of enforcement with persuasion as the first option and small penalties as the second
option).
124. Punitive approaches are supposed to reduce compliance for the following reasons.
When a firm finds it difficult or inappropriate to apply general regulations to its specific
circumstances, managers are likely to regard punishment as unreasonable because regulators
fail to acknowledge that an exception from technical compliance is warranted. Further, if a firm
inadvertently violates regulations because the rules are complex or ambiguous, managers are
likely to regard punishment by the government as unwarranted and unfair, particularly if the
violation is minor. A punitive approach by the government in these circumstances may
encourage managers to actively resist enforcement efforts by contesting whether a violation
occurred, even if the firm’s legal costs will exceed the size of the fine, or forgoing future
cooperation with the agency, such as refusing to cooperate with regulators in identifying and
solving new problems. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 119, at 1203–05 (summarizing the
arguments of proponents of regulatory cooperation); Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy S.
Rabinowitz, Punishment Versus Cooperation in Regulatory Enforcement: A Case Study of
OSHA, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 713, 718–20 (1997) (same).
125. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 122, at 35 (recommending a pyramid
strategy of enforcement with significant fines and criminal penalties for chronic
noncompliance).
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b. Incomplete contracts. If it is assumed that a mixture of
126
punishment and cooperation is the optimal enforcement strategy,
what is the optimal mix of cooperation and punishment?127
Transaction cost analysis suggests a framework for addressing this
make-or-buy issue. If an agency is dealing with an opportunistic firm,
a punitive enforcement strategy will most effectively lower
measurement costs, because opportunistic firms are more likely to
exploit a cooperative approach, thereby increasing measurement
costs for the agency. If the agency is dealing with a reliable firm, the
agency can reduce its transaction costs by adopting a cooperative
enforcement approach. Thus, the choice of the lowest cost approach
depends on the agency’s capacity to detect the reliability of the firm
with which it is negotiating.
It is unclear, however, how readily an agency can detect whether
it is dealing with an opportunistic or reliable firm because of its
bounded rationality, but the agency can employ some heuristics as a
guide. Studies of regulatory compliance suggest that certain factors
make it more likely that a firm will voluntarily comply with agency
regulations without the spur of administrative penalties.128 These
factors address the extent to which a regulated entity is subject to
marketplace or tort incentives to comply with agency regulations. In
short, cooperative approaches appear to work best when the
incentives for compliance of a regulated entity are aligned with the
agency’s enforcement goals.
2. Entrepreneurial Agreements. In a routine settlement, an
agency seeks an agreement with a regulated entity that it will come
into compliance with the regulations that it is charged with violating.
In an entrepreneurial settlement, the agency and the regulated entity
agree to a settlement that involves additional or different compliance.
126. See REES, supra note 60, at 176 (comparing the pros and cons of cooperation and
punishment, and concluding that neither “approach can be easily dismissed because each has
much to recommend it”).
127. Despite the enthusiasm for cooperative enforcement methods among some
commentators, there is little empirical evidence concerning the effectiveness of this approach.
See Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 124, at 720 (“There is little empirical evidence on the
relative effectiveness of cooperative and legalistic enforcement policies.”); see also
Rechtschaffen, supra note 119, at 1208 (“The limited empirical data actually comparing
deterrence and cooperative-oriented strategies is mixed.”).
128. See Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 74, at 129–33 (suggesting several factors, such as
the size of the business and the extent to which there are widespread social norms that compel
compliance, that predict when a firm is likely to comply voluntarily with agency regulations).
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Earlier, it was noted that both the EPA and OSHA have adopted this
129
strategy. The EPA’s Project XL is the most celebrated example of
this approach in the literature. Project XL invites firms to seek the
EPA’s agreement to ignore certain regulatory violations in return for
superior environmental performance in other areas.130 The goal for
the regulated entity is to reduce its overall compliance costs by
reducing some emissions more than the EPA’s regulations require
while reducing other emissions by less than the EPA’s regulations
require. For its part, the EPA agrees not to prosecute the firm for its
underperformance.131 For this concession, the EPA gains a net
environmental impact over what unadjusted application of regulatory
standards would have been capable of achieving.
Project XL is similar to contractual standard setting because an
applicant in effect proposes to the EPA that it agree to a different set
of regulatory standards than the ones adopted after notice and
comment rulemaking. The EPA’s use of the enforcement process
instead of rulemaking reduces the cost of revising its regulatory
standards as they apply to one regulated entity. As a variation of
contractual standard setting, however, Project XL is subject to the
same
properties—opportunistic
behavior
and
incomplete
contracting—that increase the agency’s transaction costs.
a. Opportunistic Behavior. When the EPA negotiates an
entrepreneurial agreement, such as Project XL, it is negotiating with
profit-seeking entities that opportunistically may seek to take
advantage of this situation. The EPA therefore cannot expect that a
firm’s assertion of net superior environmental performance is
necessarily accurate. Yet, Project XL is built on the premise that
regulated entities are in a better position than the EPA to identify the
best way to reduce pollution. As noted earlier, the existence of
asymmetrical information invites opportunistic behavior by a
regulated entity because it is in a position to exploit its superior access
to information to serve its own interests.132 As a result, the EPA must
pay for the costs of verifying that the agreement proposed by a
129. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
130. Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, “Improving” Project XL: Helping Adaptive
Management to Work Within EPA, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y. 155, 156 (1998).
131. EPA’s authority to make this concession is uncertain. See Rena Steinzor, Regulatory
Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,527,
10,527 (1996) (noting the observation of EPA staff members: “[i]f it isn’t illegal, it isn’t XL”).
132. See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text.
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regulated entity is consistent with its regulatory mandate and mission.
This does not mean that Project XL initiatives are not a worthwhile
investment by the agency in appropriate circumstances, but it does
mean that there may be significant resource implications in
committing to a large number of such projects, because resources
spent on these efforts are not available for conventional enforcement.
b. Incomplete Contracts. Just as the possibility of opportunistic
behavior increases an agency’s transaction costs when the agency
negotiates an entrepreneurial enforcement agreement, the potential
for incomplete agreements also increases the agency’s costs. As
discussed earlier, it is less cost effective for an agency to use
contractual standard setting when the agency cannot adequately
specify in advance the goals or parameters of the regulatory standard
133
it is seeking. The EPA is in this position in Project XL. To ensure a
positive net environmental impact as a result of the agreement, the
EPA must have a way to measure the degree of environmental
improvement that occurs. This poses two difficulties. First, the agency
and the regulated entity must agree to a baseline according to which
the improvements can be measured, and, second, the agency and the
regulated entity must agree to a methodology by which the agency
can measure the difference between the baseline and a plant’s current
emissions. These functions are particularly complicated when a
proposal involves the trading of emissions between environmental
media, e.g., trading decreased water emissions for increased air
pollution, because of the dearth of reliable science concerning the
long-term implications of such exchanges. As Professor Rena
Steinzor explains: “High transaction costs . . . . are most often
triggered by the complexity of proposals, especially those that
introduce such variables as cross-media and cross-pollutant trading,
coverage of unregulated pollutants, and the anticipation of future
regulatory requirements.”134 This complexity leaves “participants
hard-pressed to agree on a baseline for determining performance,
much less a project’s superiority—or equivalence—in relationship to
the status quo.”135

133. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
134. Rena Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from
Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 190 (1998).
135. Id.

SHAPIRO.DOC

426

06/21/04 4:03 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:389

In standard setting, the agency has the advantage that a proposed
standard is subject to public comment during the rulemaking process,
which may help reduce the agency’s bounded rationality. Because the
EPA adopts Project XL standards in the context of enforcement, it is
under no such obligation. The EPA, however, has voluntarily created
136
a process for obtaining comments from interested stakeholders.
Although this step is useful, it creates transaction costs that the EPA
can avoid if it simply enforces its regulations as written.
To summarize, entrepreneurial agreements create the
opportunity for an agency to make regulatory adjustments as part of
the enforcement process. While this presents an opportunity for the
agency to adopt a more optimal level of regulatory compliance, the
agency’s transaction costs might be greater than if the agency sought
the same outcome using traditional means.
V. SELF-REGULATION
Self-regulation is the last alternative to the traditional model
identified in the typology in Part II. In self-regulation, an agency
contracts with the same private actor to write regulatory standards
137
and to enforce them. Self-regulation presents the type of transaction
problems that arise in contractual standard setting and in contractual
enforcement, but it is more costly for the agency than engaging in
either of these functions separately, because the agency has
transaction costs arising from both functions. As was the case
regarding contractual standard setting and enforcement, these costs
are a function of opportunistic behavior, incomplete contracting, and
hold-up problems. In most instances, the costs associated with these
properties are likely to exceed any savings that an agency gains by
employing self-regulation. Thus, self-regulation is more likely to
reflect the political power of the self-regulated industry than the
product of rational decisionmaking by an agency.

136. Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,872, 19,877 (Apr. 23,
1997); see Steinzor, supra note 134, at 143–44 (describing public participation procedures).
137. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. Because this choice involves a make-orbuy decision, it is assumed that an agency is proceeding under a regulatory regime that gives it
authority to undertake regulatory functions, and the issue is whether to rely on self-regulation
instead of writing its own standards and then enforcing them. An agency can regulate an
industry for some purposes and rely on self-regulation for other purposes. Moreover, the agency
retains the authority to withdraw self-regulation, or some aspect of it, if it determines that
internal production better effectuates its legislative mandate.
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A. Opportunistic Behavior
The first difficulty is that a self-regulatory body will be
influenced by its self-interest in writing regulatory standards and in
enforcing them. The problem is more extensive in this context than in
contractual standard setting or enforcement because the selfregulatory entity has the ability to act opportunistically in both
standard setting and in enforcement. This potential increases an
agency’s transaction costs as compared to relying individually on
contractual standard setting or contractual enforcement.
The agency’s costs are a function of the extent to which the
incentives of the participants in self-regulation are congruent with the
agency’s goals. Private actors normally have different goals than a
regulatory agency, particularly when they are profit-maximizing
entities or are influenced by such entities. Earlier, it was noted that
private standard-setting organizations tend to be dominated by
interested corporations, which results in lowest-common138
denominator regulatory standards. Because self-regulation also
involves private generated standards, the same problem exists. The
regulatory standards produced by the self-regulatory body are likely
to reflect the interests of the industry it is regulating. Unless these
interests are congruent with the agency’s regulatory goals, selfregulation will not produce regulatory standards consistent with the
agency’s legislative mandate. The possibility that the industry’s
incentives will be congruent with the agency’s goals is discussed
below.
A similar problem exists concerning enforcement in selfregulation. When an agency relies on self-regulation, it is in the same
position as when it hires private actors to enforce its regulations. As
139
discussed earlier, profit-seeking private actors may attempt to
reduce the quality of their enforcement services to make more
money. Because of this potential, an agency must carefully monitor
the actions of the private actors, which may lead to higher transaction
costs than if the agency had chosen internal production in the first
place. A self-regulatory body that is nonprofit will not have this
incentive, but its enforcement activities are likely to reflect the
interests of the industry it is regulating. Unless these interests are
congruent with the agency’s regulatory goals, self-regulation will not

138.
139.

See supra Part III.A.1.
See supra Part IV.A.1.
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produce the same level of enforcement as will relying on agency
employees for this function.
To sum up, the self-regulatory entity has the opportunity to act in
an opportunistic manner regarding both standard setting and
enforcement. This potential opens the door for self-regulation to
reflect the interests of the regulated industry rather than the goals of
the regulatory agency. This makes self-regulation a dubious
proposition unless the industry has strong incentives to act
consistently with the agency’s regulatory mandate. Put another way,
are there competitive, legal, or political pressures that are likely to
ensure that self-regulation will result in the level of regulatory
protection that the agency is obligated to provide?
One such potential incentive is that self-regulation would reduce
the potential legal liability of the firms in an industry, because, if the
firms voluntarily comply with regulatory standards, they can reduce
the compensation that they might otherwise have to pay when they
140
are sued in tort or contract actions. As previously noted, however,
this situation does not involve an unregulated market. The agency is
proceeding under a regulatory regime that gives it authority to
undertake regulatory functions, and the issue is whether to rely on
self-regulation in lieu of using one of the other approaches. By
subjecting the industry to regulation, Congress has determined the
common law liability system has failed to generate a sufficient level of
protection and that regulation is necessary. Thus, it is not clear why
self-regulation, motivated by the potential of legal liability, will
produce the levels of protection that Congress intended. Moreover,
Congress’ enactment of a regulatory system indicates its preference to
avoid litigation and to engage in preventative regulatory activity.
Another potential incentive for self-regulation is to head off
regulation by an agency that may be more costly than self-regulation.
If this is the industry’s motivation for self-regulation, however, it
hardly justifies an agency in relying on self-regulation to meet its
statutory mandate to protect the public. There appears to be no point
in an industry adopting this strategy unless it results in lower
compliance costs than the industry is seeking to head off.141
140. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
141. An industry might claim that self-regulation will produce the same level of regulatory
protection as an agency, but at a lower cost, because the self-regulatory body would be in a
better position to identify less expensive regulatory alternatives. An agency operating in good
faith, however, would adopt these alternatives if they were suggested by the industry and if they
were likely to result in the same level of regulatory protection.
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The lone potential incentive that has some credibility is an
industry’s interest in promoting consumer confidence in its products
or services. An industry may seek to gain market benefits by engaging
142
in effective regulatory compliance. Self-regulation by the stock
markets illustrates this situation. Because consumer participation in
stock markets is influenced by consumer confidence in the integrity of
market operations, brokerage firms generally have an incentive to
implement effective self-regulation because their profits are related to
the number of consumers who participate in the markets.143 Thus, this
incentive aligns the industry’s profit seeking with the agency’s goals.
Recent events suggest, however, that not even the incentive of
promoting consumer confidence is sufficient to curb opportunistic
behavior by the self-regulated firm. In October 2003, a SEC staff
investigation found, according to a news report, that the American
Stock Exchange “routinely overlook[ed] rule violations by Amex
specialists,” and after “[t]he exchange promised to improve its
144
regulation,” it “then tried to cover up its failure to do so.” A
reporter described Amex as “captive regulators who did little.”145
Earlier this year, the SEC also intervened in an investigation by the
New York Stock Exchange into violations of its trading rules by some
of its members, apparently with the result that the Exchange will
impose higher fines than it originally had planned.146 In September
2003, the Chairman of the New York Stock Exchange was forced to
resign after public revelations concerning his multimillion dollar
compensation package.147 The revelations raised concerns over both
the size of the pay package and the fact that the Chairman had his pay
148
set by the managers of the firms that he regulated. It remains to be

142. See Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 74, at 113–16 (observing that a firm’s safety and
health compliance may determine whether ordinary and industrial customers purchase its
products).
143. See Adam C. Pritchard, Self-Regulation and Securities Markets, REGULATION, Spring
2003, at 32, 33–34 (arguing that because exchanges seek to increase their trading volume, they
have an incentive to police activities, such as insider trading or securities fraud, that discourage
investors from buying stock).
144. Floyd Norris, Can Exchanges Regulate Themselves as Rivalry Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
17, 2003, at C1.
145. Id.
146. Landon Thomas, Jr., S.E.C. Steps In as Fines Are Planned on 5 Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
17, 2003, at C1.
147. Kate Kelly et al., Closing Bell: Grasso Quits NYSE Amid Pay Furor, WALL ST. J., Sept.
18, 2003, at A1.
148. Id.
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seen the extent to which these regulatory failures can be attributed to
the SEC’s reliance on self-regulation of the stock markets. Still, these
events do suggest that self-regulation is not to be trusted, even in
industries where public confidence is important to the sales of their
products. There is even more reason to be dubious about selfregulation in the context of health, safety, and environmental
149
regulation. In these contexts, there is a more tenuous link, if there is
any link at all, between a firm’s reputation for regulatory integrity
150
and consumer purchase of its products.
B. Incomplete Contracting
In self-regulation, the chance for opportunistic behavior is
greater than in other forms of outsourcing. Likewise, an agency is
likely to have higher transaction costs associated with incomplete
contracting in the self-regulatory context.
In contractual standard setting, an agency’s transaction costs are
related to its bounded rationality. The more difficult it is for an
agency to specify in advance the type of regulatory standard that is
acceptable, the more likely it is that the agency will be required to
151
rewrite the standard written by a private actor. The same would be
true in self-regulation. To the extent that the contract between the
agency and the self-regulatory body is incomplete, there is a greater
likelihood that the self-regulatory body would not resolve
information defects and value conflicts in a manner that an agency
would find acceptable.
In self-regulation, however, the agency is likely to have higher
transaction costs than in contractual standard setting. In contractual
standard setting, the agency uses rulemaking to adopt privately
developed rules, but in self-regulation many standards go into effect
without this step. Because there is no rulemaking, the agency must
develop the information about the adequacy of the regulatory
standards on its own, which raises its governance costs above those
associated with contractual standard setting.

149. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 119, at 1196 (finding that there are “significant limits to
relying on the consumer product marketplace as a way to reward positive environmental
performance”).
150. See Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 74, at 114 (concluding that the “general
significance of market forces in the areas of . . . environmental and social responsibility is
unknown”).
151. See supra Part III.A.2.
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The previous analysis assumes that the agency carefully reviews
the regulatory standards that the self-regulatory body produces. If it
does not do so, there is an agency problem, because administrators
will have failed to verify that self-regulation is in fact consistent with
the agency’s mandate.
Thus, as in contractual standard setting, it may be less expensive
for an agency to write its own regulatory standards than to depend on
private actors in situations where the agency is hindered by bounded
rationality in specifying the goals or parameters of the regulation that
the agency is seeking. As self-regulation has higher transaction costs
than contractual standard setting, it is even more likely that internal
production will be less expensive than self-regulation.
C. Hold-Up Problems
An agency should be cautious about adopting self-regulation
because this choice is likely to increase significantly its transaction
costs as compared to traditional regulation. The use of internal
production reduces the agency’s costs produced by its bounded
rationality and the potential for self-interested behavior. In addition
to the problems with opportunistic behavior and incomplete
information, the hold-up problems associated with a self-regulatory
approach should give agencies pause before adopting such an
approach. The hold-up problem in this setting is similar to the one
152
identified earlier concerning contractual standard setting, although
the problem will be magnified in this context.
153
As discussed earlier, it may be more difficult for an agency to
modify or reject privately generated standards than to have relied on
internal production of the standards in the first place. The more
financially valuable it is for an agency to adopt standards written by
private actors, the more money corporations will devote to political
action to ensure that result. When an agency is likely to find itself in
this situation, internal production of standards is advisable.
The same potential exists concerning the employment of private
firms to engage in enforcement. As discussed earlier, there is
evidence that some prominent programs relying on private actors for

152.
153.

See supra Part III.A.3.
Id.
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enforcement functions may result from political influence rather than
154
from transaction cost analysis.
The same hold-up problem exists concerning self-regulation, but
the regulated industry has an even greater incentive to protect the
regulatory results than in contractual standard setting or contractual
enforcement. The industry has a greater interest because selfregulation gives an industry greater potential control over the
regulation to which it will be subject. This analysis suggests, for
example, that the SEC’s longstanding reliance on self-regulation of
the stock exchanges may reflect the political power of the industry,
rather than the SEC’s independent judgment that self-regulation is
the better way to achieve its mandate.
CONCLUSION
An economic actor will sometimes rely on other firms to produce
the goods and services that it needs, and it will sometimes produce
those goods and services itself, depending on which set of
arrangements produces the lowest transaction costs. Economists
analyze this make-or-buy decision using transaction cost analysis.
This Essay contends that regulatory agencies have a similar make-orbuy decision when they decide whether to outsource government
regulation, and that transaction cost analysis offers a useful
framework to analyze this decision. This approach leads to the
following conclusions.
Proponents of outsourcing argue that private actors can produce
the same quality of performance at a lower cost than can government
employees. The relevant question from a transaction cost perspective,
however, is whether the total cost of outsourcing government
regulation will be less than relying on government employees to
perform the same functions. When the government depends on
private actors for regulatory functions, it has the cost of contracting
with those actors and monitoring their performance. These costs can
exceed any cost savings created by relying on private actors to
perform regulatory functions.
It is true that using government employees to write and enforce
regulations has high transaction costs, but internal production should
not be condemned unless there is a superior alternative. Regulation
generates high transaction costs because it involves the resolution of
154.

See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
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difficult collective action problems. Private parties may not be any
more efficient in resolving these political problems, even if they are
highly efficient in their economic activities.
A review of the government’s regulatory functions indicates that
outsourcing government regulation will be less costly in some cases
and more costly in others. Thus, there is no a priori reason to
conclude that outsourcing regulatory functions will decrease the
government’s transaction costs as compared to internal production.
In contractual standard setting, the government relies on private
actors to draft regulatory standards, which are adopted using
rulemaking. The government’s transaction costs are a function of the
extent to which standard setting involves making decisions on the
basis of incomplete information and reconciling difficult value
conflicts, and the extent to which profit-maximizing private actors
influence the standard-writing process. Because these conditions are
relatively common, outsourcing the writing of regulatory standards
may not reduce the government’s transaction costs as compared to
internal production of standards in many instances. Agencies,
however, can reduce transaction costs related to the second problem
by using regulatory negotiation.
In contractual enforcement, the government relies on private
actors to enforce regulatory standards written by the agency. If the
government hires private actors to engage in enforcement activities,
its transaction costs are a function of the extent to which an agency
can specify the type of performance it is seeking, and the extent to
which private actors have an opportunity to reduce the quality of
their performance in order to increase their profits. Again, because
these conditions are relatively common in the enforcement of
government regulations, outsourcing enforcement may not reduce the
government’s transaction costs as compared to internal enforcement
in many instances.
The government can also involve private parties in enforcement
decisions by negotiating with them concerning the scope of regulatory
compliance. If the agency is able to obtain compliance with its
regulations by reducing the amount of the fine it imposes, it will likely
reduce its transaction costs, because it avoids the cost of adjudicating
such violations. An agency may not reduce its costs, however, when
the negotiations involve entrepreneurial agreements that seek to
modify the degree of compliance, such as Project XL. This type of
negotiation in effect involves standard setting because it alters the
degree of regulatory compliance. As such, it imposes the same
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transaction costs that an agency confronts in relying on private actors
to write regulatory standards. Because these costs are likely to be
greater than adjudicating routine violations, this form of outsourcing
government regulation may not reduce the government’s transaction
costs.
Finally, an agency can permit an industry to engage in selfregulation, which involves private actors in writing and enforcing
regulatory standards. Self-regulation presents the same type of
transaction costs that arise in contractual standard setting and
contractual enforcement, but it is more costly for the agency than
engaging in either of these functions separately. For this reason, this
form of outsourcing government regulation may not reduce the
government’s transaction costs as compared to internal production of
standards and enforcement.

